Post by account_disabled on Mar 13, 2024 3:37:58 GMT -5
The assessment of the direction of Brazilian Financial Law reveals the intensification of tension between political powers in the dispute over the country's budget channels. The Executive which had become accustomed to selectively managing the speed and intensity of the contingency to constrain its support base in Congress loses proportional weight in the face of authoritative parliamentary amendments.
The current budgetary pendulum favors Parliament which intends to institutionalize and expand its decision-making prevalence over the increasingly narrow margin of discretionary deliberation on the general budget of the Union. This movement was greatly evidenced by the result of the processing of the federal budget guidelines bill for PLDO concluded last week.
Spacca
It is worth remembering that the public CG Leads budget is by definition the space for the political construction of state priorities through dialogue and sometimes major clashes between the Executive and Legislative branches at each level of the federation. The laws that govern the budget cycle in Brazil are designed so that the budget guidelines guide the dialogue between the four-year planning and the budget for the year to which it refers. Its centrality was established by the Constitution and reinforced by the Fiscal Responsibility Law something that Constitutional Amendment or Complementary Law never structurally modified.
The LDO's fiscal targets operate as a rotational axis around which the rest of the rules move. In this sense the core nature of the primary result target persists as the main filter for monitoring and controlling budget execution. Illustratively it is worth remembering that if there is a risk of affecting the primary result target contingency must be undertaken as well as the choices relating to tax waivers and mandatory ongoing expenses are additionally burdened for the purposes of impact assessment and corresponding measure compensatory.
During the processing of PLDO in fact it became clear that the replacement of the “New Fiscal Regime” aka “primary expenditure ceiling” with the “Sustainable Fiscal Regime” better known as the “New Fiscal Framework” did not bring any significant change on the institutional weight of the primary outcome target. The more contractionary this goal is the greater the dispute between the Executive and Legislative powers will be to manage the proportionally decreasing margin for discretionary allocation of government resources.
The current budgetary pendulum favors Parliament which intends to institutionalize and expand its decision-making prevalence over the increasingly narrow margin of discretionary deliberation on the general budget of the Union. This movement was greatly evidenced by the result of the processing of the federal budget guidelines bill for PLDO concluded last week.
Spacca
It is worth remembering that the public CG Leads budget is by definition the space for the political construction of state priorities through dialogue and sometimes major clashes between the Executive and Legislative branches at each level of the federation. The laws that govern the budget cycle in Brazil are designed so that the budget guidelines guide the dialogue between the four-year planning and the budget for the year to which it refers. Its centrality was established by the Constitution and reinforced by the Fiscal Responsibility Law something that Constitutional Amendment or Complementary Law never structurally modified.
The LDO's fiscal targets operate as a rotational axis around which the rest of the rules move. In this sense the core nature of the primary result target persists as the main filter for monitoring and controlling budget execution. Illustratively it is worth remembering that if there is a risk of affecting the primary result target contingency must be undertaken as well as the choices relating to tax waivers and mandatory ongoing expenses are additionally burdened for the purposes of impact assessment and corresponding measure compensatory.
During the processing of PLDO in fact it became clear that the replacement of the “New Fiscal Regime” aka “primary expenditure ceiling” with the “Sustainable Fiscal Regime” better known as the “New Fiscal Framework” did not bring any significant change on the institutional weight of the primary outcome target. The more contractionary this goal is the greater the dispute between the Executive and Legislative powers will be to manage the proportionally decreasing margin for discretionary allocation of government resources.